Expectation is a central notion in probability the ory. The notion of expectation also makes sense for other notions of uncertainty. We introduce a propositional logic for reasoning about expec tation, where the semantics depends on the un derlying representation of uncertainty. We give sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic in the case that the underlying representation is (a) probability, (b) sets of probability measures, (c) belief functions, and (d) possibility measures. We show that this logic is more expressive than the corresponding logic for reasoning about like lihood in the case of sets of probability measures, but equi-expressive in the case of probability, belief, and possibility. Finally, we show that satisfiability for these logics is NP-complete, no harder than satisfiability for propositional logic.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important notions in probability theory is that of expectation. The expected value of a random variable is, in a sense, the single number that best describes the random variable. In this paper, we consider the notion of expectation in a more general setting.
It is well known that a probability measure determines a unique expectation function that is linear (i.e., E(aX + bY) = aE(X) + bE(Y)), monotone (i.e., X :":: Y implies E(X) :":: E(Y)), and maps constant functions to their value. Conversely, given an expectation function E (that is, a function from random variables to the reals) that is linear, monotone, and maps constant functions to their value, there is a unique probability measure J.L such that E = Ew That is, there is a 1-1 mapping from probability measures to (probabilistic) expectation functions. Walley [1991] has argued persuasively that it is necessary to occasionally go beyond probabilistic expectation. He
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Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 riccardo@cs.cornell.edu introduces lower and upper previsions, which are essen tially lower and upper expectations with respect to sets of probability measures. Characterizations of the epectation functions that arise from sets of probability measures are well known [Huber 1981; Walley 1981; Walley 1991) . However, there seems to be surprisingly little work on characterizing expectation in the context of other measures of uncertainty, such as belief functions [Shafer 1976 ) and possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990) . We provide characterizations here.
Having characterized expectation functions, we then turn to the problem of reasoning about them. We define a logic similar in spirit to that introduced in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990 ) (FHM from now on) for reasoning about likelihood expressed as either probability or belief. The same logic is used in [Halpern and Pucella 2001) (HP from now on) for reasoning about upper probabilities. The logic for reasoning about expectation is strictly more ex pressive than its counterpart for reasoning about likelihood if the underlying semantics is given in terms of sets of probability measures (so that upper probabilities and upper expectations are used, respectively); it turns out to be equi expressive in the case of probability, belief functions, and possibility measures. This is somewhat surprising, espe cially in the case of belief functions. In all cases, the fact that expectations are at least as expressive is immediate, since the expectation of rp (viewed as an indicator function, that is, the random variable that is 1 in worlds where rp is true and 0 otherwise) is equal to its likelihood. However, it is not always obvious how to express the expectation of a random variable in terms of likelihood.
We then provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic with respect to each of the interpretations of expectation that we consider, using our characterization of expectation. Finally, we show that, just as in the case of the corresponding logic for reasoning about likelihood, the complexity of the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. This is clear when the underlying semantics is given in terms of probability measures, belief functions, or possi bility measures, but it is perhaps surprising that, despite the added expressiveness in the case of sets of probability measures, reasoning in the logic remains NP-complete.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one previous attempt to express properties of expectation in a logical setting. Wilson and Moral [1994] takes as their starting point Walley's notion of lower and upper previsions. They consider when acceptance of one set of gambles implies acceptance of another gamble. This is a notion that is easily expressible in our logic when the original set of gambles is finite, so our logic subsumes theirs in the finite case. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the characterizations of expectation for probability measures and sets of probability measures are reviewed, and the char acterizations of expectation for belief functions and possi bility measures are provided. In Section 3, we introduce a logic for reasoning about expectation with respect to all these representations of uncertainty. In Section 4, we com pare the expressive power of our expectation logic to that of the logic for reasoning about likelihood. In Section 5, we derive sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic in Section 3, with respect to different representations of uncertainty. In Section 6, we discuss an axiomatization of gamble inequalities, which is assumed by the axiomatiza tions given in Section 5. Finally, in Section 7, we prove that the decision problem for the expectation logic is NP complete for each of the representations of uncertainty we consider. Due to lack of space, proofs are left to the full paper.
EXPECTATION FUNCTIONS
Recall that a random variable X on a sample space (set of possible worlds) W is a function from W to some range. Let V(X) denote the image of X, that is, the possible val ues of X. A gamble is a random variable whose range is the reals. In this paper, we focus on the expectation of gambles; we consider only,gambles X such that V(X) is finite. (This allows us to define expectation using summation rather than integration.)
EXPECTATION FOR PROBABILITY MEASURES
Given a probability measure f.! and a gamble X, the ex pected value of X (or the expectation of X) with respect to f.!, denoted E"(X), is just
(1)
This definition implicitly assumes that the gamble X is measurable, that is, for each value x E V(X), the set of worlds X = x where X takes on value x is measurable.
As is well known, probabilistic expectation functions can be characterized by a small collection of properties. Proposition 2.1: The function E" has the following prop erties for all measurable gambles X and Y.
(a) E" is additive:
The next result shows that the properties in Proposition 2.1 essentially characterize probabilistic expectation functions. It too is well known. 
EXPECTATION FOR SETS OF PROBABILITY MEASURES
If P is a set of probability measures on a space W, define
is called the lower probability of U and P* (U) is called the upper probability of U. Lower and upper probabilities have been well studied in the literature (see, for example, [Borel 1943; Smith 1961] ).
There are straightforward analogues of lower and upper probability in the context of expectation. If P is a set of probability measures such that X is measurable with respect to each probability measure f.! E P, then define Ep(X) = {EI'(X): f.! E P}. Ep(X) is a set of numbers. Define the lower expectation and upper expectation of X with respect toP, denoted Ep(X) and Ep(X), as the inf and sup of the set Ep(X), respectively. 
Superadditivity (resp., subadditivity), positive affine homo geneity, and monotonicity in fact characterize fJ.p (resp.,
Theorem 2.4: [Huber 1981 ] Suppose that E maps gambles measurable with respect to F to lR and is superadditive (resp., subadditive), positively affinely homogeneous, and monotone. Then there is a set P of probability measures on -l F such that E = Ep (resp., E = Ep).
The set P constructed in Theorem 2.4 is not unique. It is not hard to construct sets P and P' such that P i' P' but Ep = Ep.. However, there is a canonical largest set P such that E = Ep; P consists of all probability measures J.L such that EI'(X) 2: E(X) for all gambles X. This set P can be shown to be closed and convex. Indeed, it easily follows that Theorem 2.4 actually provides a 1-1 mapping from closed, convex sets of probability measures to lower/upper expectations. Moreover, in a precise sense, this is the best we can do. If P and P' have the same convex closure (where the convex closure of a set is the smallest closed, convex set containing it), then Ep = Ep,.
As Walley [ 1991] shows, what he calls coherent lower/upper previsions are also lower/upper expectations with respect to some set of probability measures. Thus, lower/upper previsions can be identified with closed, con vex sets of probability measures.
EXPECTATION FOR BELIEF FUNCTIONS
As is well known, a belief function [Shafer 1976] Bel is a function from subsets of a state space W to [0, 1] satisfying the following three properties:
1 There is an equivalent characterization of fl.'P, due to Walley [1991] . He shows that E == E.'P for some set P of probability measures iff E is superadditive, E(cX) = cE(X), and E(X) 2:
inf {X ( w) : w E W}. An analogous characterization holds for E'P.
2::: �= 1 L p<;; {l, .. ,n}VI=i} ( -l )i +t B e l (niEI U j)· Given a belief function Bel, there is a corresponding plau sibility function Plaus, where
It follows easily from B3 that Bel(U) :<::: Plaus(U) for all U � W. Bel(U) can be thought of as a lower bound of a set of probabilities and Plaus(U) can be thought of as the corresponding upper bound. This intuition is made precise in the following well-known result.
Theorem 2.5: [Dempster 1967 ] Given a belief function Bel
There is an obvious way to define a notion of expectation based on belief functions, using the identification of Bel with (PBei) •. Given a belief function Bel, define EBel == f1p 8,1 • Similarly, for the corresponding plausibility func tion Plaus, define EPtaus = Ep8,1• (These definitions are in fact used by Dempster [1967] ).
This is well defined, but it seems more natural to get a notion of expectation for belief functions that is defined purely in terms of belief functions, without reverting to probability. One way of doing so is due to Choquet [1953] .2 It takes as its point of departure the following alternate definition of expectation in the case of probability. Suppose X is a gamble such that V(X) = {x1, ... ,xn}, with x1 < ... < Xn.
An analogous definition holds for plausibility:
Proposition 2.7: [Schmeidler 1989 ] Esel = E k el and E Ptaus = E �laus· Thus, using (2), there is a way of defining expectation for belief functions without referring to probability. Since it is immediate from the definition that E Bei(Xu) = Bel(U), the inclusion-exclusion property B3 of belief func tions can be expressed in terms of expectation (just by replacing all instances of Bel(V) in B3 by E Be i(Xv )). Moreover, it does not follow from the other properties, since it can be shown not to hold for arbitrary lower proba bilities. B3 seems like a rather specialized property, since it applies only to indicator functions. There is a more general version of it that also holds for EBel· Given gambles X and Y, define the gambles X /\ Y and X V Y as the minimum and maximum of X andY, respectively; that is,
. Consider the following inclusion exclusion rule for expectation functions:
2:: 7=1 I:{Ic;; {l,. ,n}lll=i}(-l ) i +lE(IIjEI Xj) ·
Since it is immediate that Xuuv = XuV X v and Xunv = Xu/\ Xv, (4) generalizes B3.
There is yet another property satisfied by expectation func tions based on belief functions. It too is expressed in terms of indicator functions; we do not know if there is a generalization that holds for arbitrary gambles.
Proposition 2.8: The function E Bei is superadditive, pos itively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (4) and (5).
Theorem 2.9: Suppose that E is an expectation function that is positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (4) and (5). Then there is a (necessarily unique)
belief function Bel such that E = EBel·
Note that superadditivity was not assumed in the statement of Theorem 2.9. This suggests that superadditivity follows from the other properties. This is indeed the case.
Proposition 2.10: An expectation function that satisfies (4) and (5) is superadditive.
It follows easily from these results that EBei is the unique expectation function E that .is superadditive, positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (4) and (5) such that E(Xu) = Bel(U) for all U � W. Propo sition 2.8 shows that E Bel has these properties. If E' is an expectation function that has these properties, by Theorem 2.9, E' = E Bel' for some belief function Bel ' . In particular, let X be the gamble such that X ( 1) = 1, X(2) = 2, and X(3) = 3. Then /ip(X) = 13/8 but Ep,(X) = 11/8. Thus, although Ep and Ep, agree on indicator functions, they do not agree on all gambles. In light of the discussion above, it should be no surprise that P. is not a belief function.
EXPECTATION FOR POSSIBILITY MEASURES
A possibility measure Poss is a function from subsets of W to [0, 1] such that Possl. Poss(0) = 0.
Poss2. Poss (W) = 1.
Poss3. Poss(U; U;) =sup; Poss(U;).
It is well known [Dubois and Prade 1982] that a possi bility measures are special cases of plausibility functions. Thus, (3) can be used to define a notion of possibilistic expectation; indeed, this has been done in the literature [Dubois and Prade 1987] . It is immediate from Poss3 that the expectation function Ep088 defined from a possibility measure Poss in this way satisfies the sup property:
EPoss(Xu,uJ = max(EPoss(Xu.)) .
Proposition 2.11: The function E?oss is positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (5) and (6).
Theorem 2.12: Suppose that E is an expectation function that is positively affinely homogeneous, monotone, and satisfies (5) and (6). Then there is a (necessarily unique) possibility measure Pass such that E = Ep055• Note that, although Pass is a plausibility measure, and thus satisfies the analogue of ( 4) with 2: replaced by ::; , there is no need to state (4) explicitly; it follows from (6).
Moreover, just as in Lemma 2.10, it follows from the other properties that Ep055 is subadditive. (Since a possibility measure is a plausibility function, not a belief function, the corresponding expectation function is subadditive rather than superadditive.)
A LOGIC FOR REASONING ABOU T EXPECTATION
We now consider a logic for reasoning about expectation.
To set the stage, we briefly review the FHM logic for reasoning about likelihood. Although a likelihood formula involves 2:, it is easy to define similar expressions with ::;, =, >. and <,using the logical operators. For example, a1l( cp1) + · · · +akl( 'Pk) ::; b is an abbreviation for -a1€(cp1) -· · ·-akl(cpk) 2: -b. Using::; and 2: gives us=; then > can be obtained from 2: and =, using negation.
REASONING ABOUT LIKELIHOOD
The semantics of .c Qu depends on how l is interpreted. In FHM, it is interpreted as a probability measure and as a belief function; in HP, it is interpreted as an upper proba bility (determined by a set of probability measures). Thus, £( cp) is taken as the probability of cp (i.e., more precisely, the probability of the set of worlds where cp is true), the belief in cp, etc. For example, in the case of probability, define a probability structure to be a tuple M = (W , fi-, 1r ), where /1-is a probability on W3 and 1r is an interpretation, which associates with each state (or world) in W a truth assignment on the primitive propositions in <P0. Thus, 1r(s)(p) E {true, false} for s E Wand p E <P0. Extend 3 For simplicity here, we assume that all sets are measurable.
1r( s) to a truth assignment on all propositional formulas in the standard way, and associate with each propositional formula the set
The semantics of Boolean combinations of basic likelihood formulas is given in the obvious way.
We can similarly give semantics to l using lower (or upper) probability. Define a lower probability structure to be a tuple M = (W , P, 1r), W and 1r are, as before, a set of worlds and an interpretation, and P is a set of probability measures. Likelihood is interpreted as lower probability in lower probability structures:4
A belief structure has the form M = (W , Bel , 1r), where Bel is a belief function. We can interpret likelihood formulas with respect to belief structures in the obvious way. Similarly, a possibility structure has the form M = (W , Poss, 1r ), where Poss is a possibility measure. Again, we interpret likelihood formulas with respect to possibility structures in the obvious way.
Let M pr ob , M l p, M b e l , and M poss denote the set of all probability structures, lower probability structures, belief structures, and possibility structures, respectively.
REASONING ABOUT EXPECTATION
Our logic for reasoning about expectation is similar in spirit to .c Qu . The idea is to interpret a propositional formula cp as the indicator function X[.,]M• which is I in worlds where cp is true, and 0 otherwise. We can then take linear combi nations of such gambles. A (linear) propositional gamble is a linear combination of propositional formulas, of the form b1<p1 +· · ·+bn'Pn· where b1, ... , bn are reals. We use 1' to represent propositional gambles. An expectation inequality is a statement of the form a1e(1'1) + · · · + ake(l'k) 2: b, where a1 ... , ak are reals, k 2: 1, and b is a real. An expectation formula is a Boolean combination of expecta tion inequalities. We use f and g to represent expectation formulas. We use obvious abbreviations where needed, such as e('Y1)-e('Y2) 2: a for e('Yl) + (-l)e('Y2) 2: a, e(1'1) 2: e(1'2) for e(l ' l ) -e(/'2) 2: 0, e(l') ::; a for -e('Y) 2: -a, e('Y) < a for -,(e('Y) 2: a) and e('Y) = a for (e('Y) 2: a) II (e('Y) ::; a). Let .CE be the language consisting of expectation formulas.
4 ln HP, we interpreted likelihood as upper probability. We interpret it here as lower probability to bring out the connections to belief, which is an instance of lower probability. It is easy to translate from upper probabilities to lower probabilities and vice versa, since P. (U) = 1-P" (iJ).
Given a model M, we associate with a propositional gam ble 1 the gamble {II�M· where �b1'P1 + · · · + bn'Pn�M = blX['P,[ M + · · · + bnX['Pnl M· Of course, the intention is to interpret e(l) in M as the expected value of the gam ble ��� M , where the notion of "expected value" depends on the underlying semantics. In the case of probability structures, it is probabilistic expectation; in the case of belief structures, it is expected belief; in the case of lower probability structures, it is lower expectation; and so on.
Again, Boolean combinations are defined in the obvious way. We leave the obvious semantic definitions in the case of belief structures and lower probability structures to the reader.
EXPRESSIVE POWER
It is easy to see that LE is at least as expressive as LQU. Since the expected value of an indicator function is its likelihood, for all the notions of likelihood we are con sidering, replacing all occurrences of £( <p ) in a formula in LQU by e(<p) gives an equivalent formula in LE. Is [_E strictly more expressive than £_QU? That depends on the underlying semantics.
In the case of probability, it is easy to see that it is not. Using additivity and affine homogeneity, it is easy to take an arbitrary formula I E LE and find a formula f' E LE that is equivalent to I (with respect to structures in Mp ro b ) such that e is applied only to propositional formulas. Then using the equivalence of e( <p) and £( <p ), we can find a for mula I T E £_QU equivalent to I with respect to structures in M prob . It should be clear that the translation I to I T causes at most a linear blowup in the size of the formula.
The same is true if we interpret formulas with respect to M b e l and M poss. In both cases, given a formula I E L E, we can use (5) to find a formula f' E LE equivalent to I such that e is applied only to propositional formulas. (The details are in the full paper.) It is then easy to find a formula IT E £_QU equivalent to f' with respect to structures in What about lower expectation/probability? In this case, [_E is strictly more expressive than £_QU, It is not hard to construct two structures in M 1P that agree on all formulas in LQu but disagree on formulas in LE such as e(p + q) > 1/2. That means that there cannot be a formula in £_QU equivalent to e(p + q) > 1/2.
The following theorem summarizes this discussion. [_E is strictly more expressive than £_QU with respect to M 1 P .
AXIOMATIZING EXPECTATION
In FHM, a sound and complete axiomatization is provided for LQU both with respect to M p r o b and M b e l ; in HP, a sound and complete axiomatization is provided for £_QU with respect to M1P. Here we provide a sound and com plete axiomatization for LE with respect to these struc tures.
The axiomatization for £_QU given in FHM splits into three parts, dealing respectively with propositional reasoning, reasoning about linear inequalities, and reasoning about likelihood. We follow the same pattern here. The following axioms characterize propositional reasoning:
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies in the language LE.
MP. From I and I=} g infer g.
Instances of Taut include aJI formulas of the form IV •I, where I is an expectation formula. We could replace Taut by a simple collection of axioms that characterize propo sitional reasoning (see, for example, [Mendelson 1964] ), but we have chosen to focus on aspects of reasoning about expectations.
The following axiom characterizes reasoning about linear inequalities:
Ineq. All instances in LE of valid formulas about linear inequalities
This axiom is taken from FHM. There, an inequality for mula is taken to be a Boolean combination of formulas of the forma1x1+···+anxn � c,over variablesx1, ... ,xn . Such a formula is valid if the resulting inequality holds un der every possible assignment of real numbers to variables.
To get an instance of Ineq, we replace each variable x; that occurs in a valid formula about linear inequalities by a primitive expectation term of the form e(li) (naturally each occurrence of the variable Xi must be replaced by the same primitive expectation term e(l;)). As with Taut, we can replace Ineq by a sound and complete axiomatization for Boolean combinations of linear inequalities. One such axiomatization is given in FHM.
The following axioms characterize probabilistic expecta tion in terms of the properties described in Proposition 2.1.
El. e(l1 + 12) = e(I J ) + e(l z ) ,
E2. e(a<p) = ae(<p) for all a E lR, Let AXprob be the axiomatization {Taut, MP, Ineq, El, E2, E3, E4, E5}. As usual, given an axiom system AX, we say that a formula f is AX-provable if it can be proved using the axioms and rules of inferences of AX. AX is sound with respect to a class M of structures if every AX-provable formula is valid in M. AX is is complete with respect to M if every formula that is valid in M is AX-provable. The characterizations of Theorems 2.4 and 2.9 suggest the appropriate axioms for reasoning about lower expectations and expected beliefs.
The following axioms capture the properties specified in Proposition 2.3:
E6. e(/1 + /2) � e(/1) + e(/2),
E8. e(a1 + bfalse) = ae(!), for all a, bE lR, a� 0.
Axiom E6 is superadditivity of the expectation. Axioms E7 and E8 capture positive affine homogeneity. Note that because we do not have additivity, we cannot get away with simpler axioms as in the case of probability.
5
We could have taken a more complex language that contains both expectation formulas and gamble inequalities. We could then merge the axiomatizations for expectation formulas and gamble inequalities. For simplicity, and to clarify the relationship be tween reasoning about expectation versus reasoning about like lihood (see Section 4), we consider only the restricted language in this paper.
Monotonicity is captured, as in the case of probability measures, by axiom E5. Let AX1P be the axiomatization {Taut, MP, Ineq, E5, E6, E7, ES}.
Theorem 5.2: AX1P is a sound and complete axiomatiza tion of £E with respect to M1P.
Although it would seem that Theorem 5.2 should follow easily from Proposition 2.3, this is, unfortunately, not the case. As usual, soundness is straightforward, and to prove completeness, it suffices to show that if a formula f is consistent with AX1P, it is satisfiable in a structure in M1P. Indeed, it suffices to consider formulas f that are conjunc tions of expectation inequalities and their negations. How ever, the usual approach for proving completeness in modal logic, which involves considering maximal consistent sets and canonical structures does not work. The problem is that there are maximal consistent sets of formulas that are not satisfiable. For example, there is a maximal consistent set of formulas that includes e(p) > 0 and e(p) ::; 1/n for n = 1, 2, ... ; this is clearly unsatisfiable. A similar problem arises in the completeness proofs for J:_QU given in FHM and HP, but the techniques used there do not seem to suffice for dealing with expectations.
Of course, it is the case that any expectation function that satisfies the constraints in the formula f and also every instance of axioms E6, E7, and ES must be a lower expec tation, by Theorem 2.4. The problem is that, a priori, there are infinitely many relevant instances of the axioms. To get completeness, we must reduce this to a finite number of instances of these axioms. It turns out that this can be done, using techniques from linear programming and Walley's [ 1991] notion of natural extension. We leave the (quite nontrivial!) details to the full paper.
It is also worth noting that, although £E is a more ex pressive language than J:_QU in the case of lower proba bility/expectation, the axiomatization for £E in this case is much more elegant than the corresponding axiomatization for J:_QU given in HP.
We next consider expectation with respect to belief. As expected, the axioms capturing the interpretation of belief expectation rely on the properties pointed out in Propo sition 2.8. Stating these properties in the logic requires a way to express the max and min of two propositional gambles. It turns out that we can view the notation 11 v 12 as an abbreviation for a more complex expression. Given a propositional gamble 1 = b1 r.p1 + · · · + bn 'Pn• we construct an equivalent gamble 1' as follows. First define a family P A of propositional formulas indexed by A� {1, ... ,n} by taking P A = 1\ iE A 'Pi 1\ (1\ {j�A � r.pj ) · Thus, P With these definitions, the following axioms account for properties (4) and (5): E9. e(/1 V ... V!n) = 2:�= 1 l:{I<;; { I, . .. ,n}VI= i } ( -l )i + l e( /\jEI / j ). Finally, we consider expectation with respect to possibility. The axioms capturing the interpretation of possibilistic ex pectation E Poss rely on the properties pointed out in Propo sition 2.1 1. The following axiom accounts for property (6):
Ell is really a finitary version of (6); it essentially says that e(cp1 V 'P2) = max(e(cpJ), e(cp2)). This finitary version turns out to suffice for completeness and HP when dealing with complexity issues.) Let .Cf be the resulting language. We can still express rational coefficients in .Cf by the standard trick of "clearing the denominator". is NP-complete.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the logic for reasoning about gam ble inequalities discussed in Section 6 is also NP-complete.
Theorem 7.2: The problem of deciding whether a formula of £9 is satisfiable in MY is NP-complete.
